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Do the characteristics of local social structures affect fertilizer adoption among 
rural households?  This paper extends the model of technology adoption of Feder and 
Slade (1984) to incorporate social capital, and then tests the model with household data 
from two agro-ecological zones in rural Tanzania.  Probit estimates of the model show 
that the probability of adoption of improved fertilizer in 1994-95 in the Central Plateau 
region is increasing in land under cultivation, cumulative adoption patterns, ethnically-
based social affiliations, the adoption of improved seeds, the availability of credit and 
extension services, and the average years of residence in the village.  In the Plains 
region, this probability is increasing in land under cultivation, ethnically based social 
affiliations and consultative norms.  Overall, these results, which are robust after testing 
for the likely reverse causality of land under cultivation, support the finding that 
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I. Introduction
1 
Despite being perhaps the most important purchased input in African agriculture, 
fertilizer has not grown in use among Tanzanian smallholder farmers since the early 
1980s (Kherallah et al. 2000).
2  In 1994, fertilizer use in Tanzania averaged 10 kilograms 
per hectare, as opposed to 18 kilograms in Africa and 94 kilograms in the world (World 
Bank 2000).  Farm size, human capital, the availability of extension services, 
geographical characteristics, and relative prices are among the determinants of fertilizer 
adoption that have been identified in the last decade  (Nkonya et al. 1997; Kaliba et al. 
2000).        
Fertilizer adoption in rural Tanzania is an excellent candidate for testing an 
economic model of information diffusion and technology adoption that incorporates 
social capital, “the set of elements of the social structure that affects relations among 
people and are inputs or arguments of the production and/or utility function” (Schiff 
1992, p. 158).
3  Nkonya et al. (1998) found that while seed technologies are normally 
                                                 
1  I thank the Center for Institutional Reform and the Informal Sector (The IRIS Center) 
for financial support for this research; Deepa Narayan for permission to use the data from the 
Social Capital and Poverty Survey; and the staff of the Economic and Social Research 
Foundation for assistance in obtaining the National Sample Census of Agriculture.  For their 
critiques and suggestions on earlier drafts of this paper, I thank Anand Swamy, Harry Kelejian, 
Peter Murrell, Kurt Finsterbusch, Michael Woolcock, Ephriam Nkonya, and an anonymous 
referee.  On this and related research, I thank Roger Betancourt for his guidance.   
2 Most Tanzanian smallholder farmers grow maize as a subsistence and cash crop.  At 
high and intermediate altitudes, inorganic fertilizer (including urea, calcium ammonium nitrate, 
or sulfate of ammonia) can significantly increase returns to maize production as well as other 
staple crops (Hawassi et al. 1998; Katinila et al., 1998).   
3 Woolcock (1998) defines social capital as ‘the norms and networks that facilitate 
collective action’ and presents other definitions based on an extensive literature search.        3 
adopted very rapidly, fertilizer is not adopted until farmers have compiled knowledge 
about its use.  Katinila et al. (1998) find that farmers in southern Tanzania lack 
knowledge about using inorganic fertilizer, but that the main sources of information about 
its use are extension agents and other farmers. 
Is information diffusion about inorganic fertilizer in Tanzania affected by 
characteristics of local social structures?  Detray (1995) found that member-controlled 
participatory associations have a significant positive effect on farmers’ market orientation 
in two regions in Tanzania.  Narayan and Pritchett (1999), in their seminal study on 
poverty and social capital in rural Tanzania, find that households in villages with high 
levels of their ‘social capital index’ have greater use of modern agricultural inputs.  They 
do not, however, test a formal model of technology adoption with a complete set of data 
that includes other potential determinants of adoption, including household-level land 
endowments and village-level adoption patterns.  In addition, they did not test whether 
specific characteristics of social structures -- including group homogeneity, participatory 
norms, and leadership heterogeneity -- are the critical determinants of adoption. 
In this paper, I extend the model of Feder and Slade (1984) in which the 
acquisition of information and the adoption of new technology are increasing in two 
household-level characteristics -- human capital and land -- and two village-level 
characteristics -- the cumulative proportion of adopters and social capital.  The model is 
then tested using household data from two recent household surveys in rural Tanzania,        4 
which include information on fertilizer adoption, selected household- and village-level 
characteristics, and characteristics of local social structures. 
 
II.  Information Diffusion and Technology Adoption 
Adoption of improved technologies can dramatically improve the well-being of 
agricultural households, but many questions about the determinants of adoption remain 
unanswered (Feder, Just, and Zilberman 1985, Besley and Case 1993).
4  Economic 
research on technology adoption in rural areas has only partially addressed the issue of 
how the social structure can affect adoption (Feder and Slade 1984; Case 1992; Foster 
and Rosenzweig 1995; Pomp and Burger 1995).  These studies build their modeling or 
empirical estimation on a very likely assumption: that neighboring agricultural 
households are, de facto, members of a social structure who exchange information about 
improved agricultural practices.  None of these studies models or tests how social 
structures, which vary from village to village, may affect adoption.
5   
However, much non-economic research suggests that the characteristics of social 
structures are critical determinants of information diffusion among rural households.   
Specifically, Rogers (1995) cites three characteristics of social structures that promote 
                                                 
4 Following Feder, Just, and Zilberman (1985), adoption is defined as “the degree of use 
of a new technology in long-run equilibrium when the farmer has full information about the new 
technology and its potential.”   
5 In her study, for example, Case (1992) does note that if more information were known 
about the ‘amount of influence that each [neighboring] household wields,’ then this could be 
integrated into the estimation procedure.  More recent research has looked at social networks and 
information diffusion in other settings: Barr (1997) finds empirical evidence that information        5 
more rapid diffusion of innovations in rural settings.  Group homogeneity
6, the degree to 
which two or more individuals who interact are similar in certain attributes, promotes 
more information sharing.  When individuals share common attributes and beliefs, 
communication between them is more likely to be effective.  For example, Munshi and 
Myaux (1998) find evidence that information diffused among households with similar 
religious affiliations helps to explain the adoption of improved contraception methods in 
Matlab, Bangladesh.   
Participatory norms, the degree to which local customs promote interactive 
decision-making, promote more rapid diffusion.  In villages with such social norms, 
innovators are able to share their new ideas and influence the opinions of others -- 
through the established consultative mechanisms.  Rogers (1995) presents a range of 
evidence that when norms favor communication and interaction among agents, ‘early’ 
adopters can share more rapidly their successful use of innovations.   
Leadership heterogeneity, the degree to which leaders within a social structure 
differ in certain attributes, can also accelerate the diffusion of innovations.  When villages 
leaders have dissimilar social and economic characteristics -- and therefore different 
contacts across social subsystems -- they can learn about the use of innovations from 
outside sources and then share this new information with other local villagers.  In a range 
of settings, Granovetter (1973) has shown that when leaders have different professions or 
                                                                                                                                                 
diffused via social networks helps to explain productivity difference among Ghanaian 
enterprises. 
6 Rogers uses the terms ‘homophily’ and ‘heterophily’, respectively, for homogeneity 
and heterogeneity within social structures.        6 
higher socioeconomic status than other members of a social structure, this can provide an 
information link between two different sets of agents: such links are critical in 
information sharing about innovations across group.  
 
III.  Extending a Model of Technology Adoption 
Feder and Slade (1984) present and test a model of technology diffusion that 
incorporates passive information accumulation through farmer’s contacts with neighbors.  
Their model predicts that farmers with more schooling and greater land will have more 
knowledge of improved practices and will adopt these practices more rapidly.   The 
extension of their model presented in this section includes characteristics of local social 
structures as a fixed input into the accumulation of household knowledge, which affects 
the adoption decision.  This extended model is then estimated to test whether group 
homogeneity, participatory norms, and leadership heterogeneity promote the adoption of 
fertilizer.    
A.  The Model of Feder and Slade (1984). 
The model of Feder and Slade (1984) begins by considering a single village of M 
farmers.  An improved agricultural input has recently been exogenously introduced into 
the village, for example, by a trader in a local market or by an extension agent.   
Each farmer’s stock of knowledge in period t is defined as
7: 
(1) Kt = Kt-1 + At + It, 
                                                 
7 For notational simplicity, the index for each farmer is subsumed in this and all 
subsequent equations for the theoretical model.         7 
where Kt-1  is the carried-over stock from the previous period, At is private 
‘actively acquired’ information, and It is public ‘passively acquired’ information.   
Public information is available to all farmers without cost.  Private information 
requires monetary resources (or time).  Its cost is:  
(2) Ct=C(At),  
where C(.) is a convex cost function, so that C′  > 0, C′′  > 0, and C(0) = 0.   
Let agricultural production be a function of both the general and input-specific 
impacts of knowledge.  Each farmer’s agricultural output Yt depends on a positive stock 
of knowledge, a positive endowment of land (L), and a non-negative amount of the 
improved input (Nt) as follows:  
(3) Yt = g(Kt) F(L, h(Kt) Nt).   
Let a positive amount of Nt be characterized as household-level adoption of the 
improved input.  The general impact of knowledge on productivity is represented by the 
knowledge function g(.).  Assume that g is concave, so that g′  > 0, g′′  < 0.  In addition, 
assume that g(.) converges to an upper limit (g*) as cumulative knowledge increases to an 
upper limit (K
1).  Likewise, the input-specific impact of knowledge on productivity is 
represented by the knowledge function h(.), with similar properties.   
Let the production function F(.,.) be concave and linearly homogenous (constant 
returns to scale) in its two arguments, land and the product of the improved input and the 
productivity-shifting knowledge function h(.).  Assume also that F(.,0) > 0 and FL(.,0) =        8 
F0
* > 0 (and is finite), so that farmers who use none of the improved input can still 
produce an output.
8 
With the assumption of constant returns to scale of F(.,.) in its two arguments, the 
output per acre for each farmer is yt: 
(4) yt = g(Kt) f(h(Kt) nt),  
where nt is the amount of the improved input per acre.  From the assumptions 
about F(.), f′  > 0, f′′  < 0, f (0) > 0, and f′  (0) = f′ 0  > 0 (and is finite).  
The per-period profit for the farmer is: 
(5)  Π t = L [g(Kt) f(h(Kt) nt) - pnt ] - C(At),  
where p is the price of Nt and output price is unity.  The farmer’s myopic 
objective is to maximize (5) subject to (1) and nt ≥  0, At  ≥  0.   
B.  Extension of the Model of Feder and Slade (1984).  
This model is extended here in three ways.  Human capital is formally introduced 
into the model,
9 and the quantity of public information is affected by the village-wide 
cumulative proportion of adopters and village-wide social capital. 
To introduce human capital into the model, let the impact of knowledge be 
dependent on each farmer’s level of human capital.  First, the general impact of 
                                                 
8 The model of Feder and Slade (1984) does not consider the effect of labor inputs.  How 
is this justified, as labor is clearly a necessary input into agricultural production?  Labor and 
other (variable or fixed) inputs can easily be integrated into a more fully specified production 
function (where a concave and linearly homogenous production function F*(.,.) has n arguments 
--  land, the product of the improved input and the productivity-shifting knowledge function, and 
n-2 other inputs).  But as long as there are no interactive effects between labor and the other 
possible inputs, the solutions for such a production function do not affect the fundamental results 
on knowledge and technology adoption that are the focus of this model.        9 
knowledge on productivity is now represented by the productivity function g = g(V, Kt), 
where V is each farmer’s stock of human capital.  Assume that overall productivity is 
increasing in both human capital and knowledge (so that gv, gk > 0, gvv, gkk < 0, and gvk > 
0).  Let g(.) converge to an upper limit (g*|V) as cumulative knowledge increases to an 
upper limit (K
1).  Note that the upper limit g*|V is increasing in the level of human 
capital: with the stock K
1, farmers with more human capital will achieve higher levels of 
productivity.  Let the input-specific impact of knowledge on productivity now be 
represented by the knowledge function h = h(V, Kt), with similar properties. 
Let public information in each period be increasing in the village-wide adoption 
pattern and social capital, sot that It is defined as: 
(6) It=I(Mt, St), 
where Mt is the cumulative proportion of village-level adopters at the beginning of  
period t and St is village-level social capital.  Assume that Im, Is > 0, Imm, Iss < 0, and Ims > 
0.  
With these two modifications, per acre output and per period profit are, respectively: 
(4)* yt = g(V,Kt) f(h(V,Kt) nt);  
(5)*  Π t = L [g(V,Kt) f(h(V,Kt) nt) - pnt ] - C(At).    
Under this extended set-up, the maximization of profits will now be affected by 
human capital, the cumulative proportion of adopters and social capital. 
                                                                                                                                                 
9 Feder and Slade (1984) suggest that human capital can be integrated into their model 
but do not formally extend the model.        10 
Based on these extensions, the farmer’s myopic objective is to maximize (5)* 
subject to (1), (6) and non-negativity of the choice variables (At ≥  0, nt  ≥  0).  The first 
order conditions (FOC) for an optimum of this Kuhn-Tucker problem are:  
(7)  Π a = L [gf′ hkn + gkf] - C′  ≤  0 and AtΠ a = 0.  
(8)  Π n = L [gf′ h – p] ≤  0 and ntΠ n = 0; 
Based on these conditions, there are four possible solutions for a maximum: 
•  No knowledge accumulation and no adoption (A = 0, n = 0), where 
 (9a)  Π a = L gkf - C′  < 0 and Π n = L [gf′ h – p] < 0; 
•  Knowledge accumulation and no adoption (A > 0, n = 0), where  
 (9b)  Π a = L gkf - C′  = 0 and Π n = L [gf′ h – p] < 0; 
•  Knowledge accumulation and adoption (A > 0, n > 0), where  
 (9c)  Π a = L [gf′ hkn + gkf] - C′  = 0 and Π n = L [gf′ h – p] = 0;  
•  No knowledge accumulation and adoption (A =0, n > 0), where 
 (9d)  Π a =  C(0)′  = 0 and Π n = L [gf′ h – p] = 0.  
The solutions of the model define a process of knowledge accumulation and 
adoption in a village where a new technology has been introduced. Farmers who acquire 
private information will do so until the value of its marginal product, through its effect on 
general productivity (equation 9b) or input-specific productivity (9c) equals it cost.   
Farmers who adopt a new technology (9c and 9d) will do so until the per-hectare value of 
its marginal product, through its direct effect on output, equals its unit price. 
This set of solutions defines a process of knowledge accumulation and adoption in 
a village where a new technology is introduced.  Four propositions about the determinants        11 
of knowledge accumulation and adoption at the household level can be derived from 
these solutions
10:  
Proposition 1: Farmers with greater land will obtain more private information 
and adopt more rapidly. 
Proposition 2: Farmers with more human capital will obtain more private 
information and adopt more rapidly. 
Proposition 3:  Farmers with neighbors that adopt will have higher levels of 
cumulative information and adopt more rapidly.  
Proposition 4:  Farmers in villages with higher levels of social capital will have 
higher levels of cumulative information and adopt more rapidly. 
 
The intuition behind these propositions is as follows.  Ceteris paribus, farmers 
with higher levels of land and higher levels of human capital will obtain more private 
information: with more land or education, a small increase of knowledge will have a 
greater marginal effect on farm productivity.  Ceteris paribus, farmers in villages with 
more adopters among neighboring farmers and with higher levels of social capital have 
more cumulative information: each of these characteristics are associated with knowledge 
spillovers.  Both of these increases of information will lead to a more rapid adoption of 
the new technology.
11 
To estimate this model, begin by letting Kij* be a latent random variable for 
household i in village j which is some measure of the household’s stock of knowledge 
                                                 
10 The proofs of these propositions are available from the author. 
11 Note that this model is consistent with the possibility that some elements of the social 
structure can have negative effects on the availability of public information and the adoption of 
new technologies.  For example, in villages with high levels of inequality and norms that        12 
about improved agricultural practices in a given year t.  Assume that Kij* is a linear 
function of a set of non-stochastic household-level independent variables and an error 
term.  These household-level covariates include (as predicted by propositions 1 and 2) 
human capital (Hij) and land (Lij) as well as a vector of other household-level variables 
(X
h
ij) that could affect the accumulation of knowledge (including household 
demographics and agricultural practices). 
Let Kij* also be a function of a village-level fixed effect (Wj) which affects all 
households within village j, so that: 
(10) Kij* = β 0 + Hijβ 1 +  Lijβ 2 + X
h
ijβ 3 + Wj  + µ ij,  
i = 1 … mj, j = 1 … n* 
where µ ij is iid ~ N(0,1).
12     
Let the fixed effect Wj  be a linear function of non-stochastic village-level 
independent variables and an error term.  These covariates include (as predicted by 
propositions 3 and 4) the cumulative proportion of adopters (Pj) and social capital (Sj) as 
well as a vector of other village-level variables (X
v
j) that could affect the accumulation of 
knowledge (including agricultural resources and village wealth and migration).   
Accordingly,   
(11) Wj = α 0 + Pjα 1 + Sjα 2 + X
v
jα 3 + ε j,    
j = 1 … n*, 
                                                                                                                                                 
discourage social contacts between the rich and the poor, these norms would hinder the flow of 
public information about agricultural practices from the rich to the poor.        13 
where ε j is iid ~ N(0,σ ε
2).   
Combining (10) and (11) yields: 
(12) Kij* = β 0 + α 0 + Hijβ 1 + Lijβ 2 + Pjα 1 + Sjα 2 + X
h
ijβ 3 + X
v
jα 3 + µ ij + ε j, 
      i = 1 … mj, j = 1 … n*.   
Assuming that the process (ε j) is independent of the process (µ ij), (3) has the 
structure of a random effects model (Greene 1993).  Propositions 1 - 4 of the model 
predict that β 1, β 2 , α 1 and α 2 in (3) will be positive. 
Unfortunately,  Kij*, some measure of the total amount of knowledge about 
improved agricultural practices of each household, is not observed.  Instead, only the 
adoption decision about improved fertilizer of each farmer is observed.  Let Fij = 1 if the 
measure of knowledge exceeds a certain amount K
f and the improved fertilizer is adopted, 
and let Fij = 0 if the measure is less than K























Formal estimation of (12) requires data on fertilizer adoption (Fij), human capital 
(Hij), land (Lij), cumulative proportion of adopters (Pj), social capital (Sj), as well as other 
possible household-level (Xij
h) and village- level regressors (Xj
v).   
                                                                                                                                                 
12 Households are indexed from 1 to mj since the number of households surveyed per 
village varies from 10 to 15.        14 
 
IV.  Data for Estimating the Model of Technology Adoption 
In order to estimate this model, two data sets -- from surveys conducted in 
overlapping villages but not in the same households -- were merged.
13  The Social Capital 
and Poverty Survey (SCPS), conducted in 1995, was a stratified random sample of 
households in 87 villages across Tanzania.  In addition to collecting a limited amount of 
household data on family demographics, household expenditures and some agricultural 
practices and characteristics (but not on land under cultivation), this survey collected 
detailed information about local social structures within these villages.  To assess the 
characteristics of social structures, the survey primarily focused on household activity in 
local organizations: social organizations as well as religious and economic groups.
14   
The National Sample Census of Agriculture (NSCA) was conducted in two 
consecutive agricultural seasons (1993-94 and 1994-95) in households in 540 villages.  It 
contains detailed information on the use of fertilizer, land under cultivation and land 
availability, human capital, and other household demographics.   
                                                 
13 The variables in each of these data sets were collected by teams of local enumerators 
who were trained by members of the department of economics of the University of Dar es 
Salaam.  After tests of the survey instruments, each enumerator was able to interview about five 
households per day.  Detailed documentation of the methodology for the HRDS can be found in 
World Bank (1995).     
14  This was the first household-level survey that integrated the collection of household 
data on the causes and consequences of economic decisions (compatible with the World Bank’s 
Living Standards Measurement Study (LSMS)) and data on local social structures.  Since its 
implementation in 1995, there have been three other such surveys conducted in Bolivia, Burkina 
Faso and Indonesia (World Bank 1998).            15 
Based on the merging of these two data sets, the model can be tested in two 
different agro-ecological zones: the central plateau (297 households from the 1994-95 
season in 23 villages) and the plains (142 households from the 1994-95 season in 11 
villages).
15   For these households, means and standard deviations of selected household- 
and village-level variables are presented in Table 1.   
                                                 
15 Data from additional households was available from one other agro-ecological zone -- 
the highlands -- but the model is inestimable among the six villages in this zone because of the 
presence of four village-level regressors (the three social capital variables and ‘years in village’, 
as detailed below) and the lack of village-level variance of ‘cumulative adoption’ (since three 
villages had complete adoption, and three others had no adoption.)        16 
 
Table 1: Selected Summary Statistics in Rural Tanzania 
                                    Summary statistics 




variable Fertilizer  adoption  0.26 0.09 
   (0.44)  (0.29) 
Predicted   Education (in years)  4.64  4.17 
determinants     (2.82)  (2.76) 
of adoption  Land (in log hectares)  4.07  3.40 
   (1.21)  (1.29) 
 Cumulative  adoption  0.24  0.08 
   (0.35)  (0.10) 
 Ethnic  affiliations  0.23  0.22 
   (0.21)  (0.07) 
 Consultative  norms  0.66  0.73 
   (0.17)  (0.21) 
 Leadership  heterogeneity  0.29  0.33 
   (0.15)  (0.16) 
Other   Female  0.13  0.23 
possible     (0.33)  (0.42) 
determinants  Age (in years)  44.7  46.6 
of adoption    (15.4)  (15.3) 
 Improved  seeds  0.23  0.23 
   (0.42)  (0.42) 
 Credit  availability  0.09  0.07 
   (0.29)  (0.26) 
 Extension  activity  0.15  0.20 
   (0.36)  (0.40) 
  Years in village  18.4  18.0 
   (2.5)  (2.3) 
Note: Means and (standard deviations) of selected variables.  See 
text for description of variables. 
        17 
As listed in Table 1, the dependent variable is ‘fertilizer adoption’, a dichotomous 
variable that indicates whether households surveyed in the HRDS report using some 
inorganic fertilizer in the 1994-95 season.     
The variables that are used to test the first three propositions of the model, derived 
from the HRDS, are as follows.  ‘Years of education’ is the years of education of the head 
of the household, calculated from the self-reported highest grade completed. ‘Land’ is the 
log of hectares of cultivated land, calculated from self-reported estimates of land per 
household
16.   ‘Cumulative adoption’ is the village cumulative proportion of adopters in 
the 1994-95 season, excluding the farmer concerned.   
The village-level variables that are used to test the fourth proposition of the model 
are derived from the SCPS.  From this survey data, three different variables were created 
to measure the three characteristics of social structures identified by Rogers (1995) that 
promote diffusion of innovations: group homogeneity, participatory norms, and 
leadership heterogeneity.  All of these variables were derived from self-reported 
household activity in social organizations and religious and economic groups.  When a 
household was a member of more than one organization, these variables were derived 
from average group characteristics.     
‘Ethnic affiliations’ is the village share of households that report that their local 
organizations include only members of the same clan (as opposed to different ethnic 
groups).  Note that this measure might differ from the overall ethnic fractionalization of        18 
the villages themselves.  For example, if a village was ethnically heterogeneous but the 
social groups within the village were ethnically homogeneous -- so that villagers tend to 
socialize only with their own ethnic group -- the variable would capture this difference.  
‘Consultative norms’ is the village share of households that report that members vote and 
discuss decisions within their local organizations, as opposed to having decisions made 
by leaders alone.  ‘Leadership heterogeneity’ is the village share of households that report 
that their local organizations have leaders with different livelihoods than other village 
members.   
The variables that are used to measure other household- and village-level 
characteristics that could effect the adoption decision are: ‘age’, the self-reported age of 
the household head, and ‘age squared’; ‘female’, a dummy variables for female headed-
households; ‘improved seeds’, a dummy variable for households that reports using this 
technology;
17 ‘credit availability’, a dummy variable for households that report that credit 
is available to their household; ‘extension activity’, a dummy variable for households that 
report that they were visited by an extension agent; and ‘years in village’, the average 
years of residence in the village.  All but the last of these variables was derived from the 
HRDS: the years of residence in the village were not part of the HRDS survey instrument, 
so the village-level mean from the SCPS is used as ‘years in village.’  The choice of these 
variables as regressors in the basic model is based on literature reviews of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
16 This is the same measure of land used by Feder and Slade (1984).  Using the 
logarithmic transformation imposes a decreasing effect of land endowments on the probability of 
adoption.        19 
determinants of adoption (Feder, Just and Zilberman 1985, Besley and Case 1993) and 
recent research on Tanzania (Nkonya et al. 1997; Hawassi et al. 1998; Kaliba et al. 
2000).  
V. Empirical  Results 
Table 2 reports the results of standard probit estimation of the model -- adjusted 
for possible heterogeneity with Huber-adjusted standard errors.  As noted in section III, 
the presence of a village-level error term in (13) calls for the use of random effects probit 
to estimate the model.  Using the estimating equation (GEE) approach of Liang and Zeger 
(1986), a likelihood ratio test reveals that the village-level variance component is 
negligible, so that the random effects probit estimate is not significantly different from 
the standard probit model. 
Estimation of the model also accounts for the likely endogeneity of the amount of 
land under cultivation, because there may be reverse causality: adoption of fertilizer 
makes a farmer wealthier, which may allow the farmer to cultivate more land.
18  Probit 
estimation with instrumental variables (using the technique of Newey (1987)) can correct 
for reverse causality.  The challenge is to find suitable instruments: variables that are 
                                                                                                                                                 
17 Both Nkonya et al. (1998) and Kaliba et al. (1998) present empirical evidence that 
Tanzanian smallholders tend to adopt improved seeds before inorganic fertilizer. 
18 I thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion.  In a previous draft of the paper, 
instruments for ‘ethnic affiliations’ and ‘consultative norms’ were also used to estimate the 
model.  Many readers reacted that reverse causality -- household-level fertilizer adoption in 
1994-95 affecting the composition of groups that have been in these villages for many years -- 
was unlikely and that measurement error problems were no more likely with these variables than 
with other variables in the model.  For the model estimated in this draft, two different tests -- 
based on Smith and Blundell (1986) and Rivers and Vuong (1988) -- cannot reject the null of the        20 
positively correlated with ‘land’ -- the log of land under cultivation -- and not strongly 
correlated with the household-level error term in (13).  Using additional data from the 
HRDS survey, the following four household-level variables were constructed and used as 
instruments for ‘land’: the total amount of land available to the household for cultivation 
that is owned; rented; leased from the government; and borrowed from a relative.  These 
variables, like ‘land’, were derived from detailed documentation on land use and 
availability provided by the household head and tabulated by the survey enumerator. 
Accordingly, Table 2 is organized as follows.  Columns 1 and 3 list standard 
probit estimates for the Central Plateau and the Plains, respectively.  Columns 2 and 4 list 
the probit estimation with instrumental variables.     
The theoretical model included four propositions about the determinants of 
adoption: that the probability of adoption is increasing in human capital (proposition 1), 
land (proposition 2), cumulative proportion of adopters (proposition 3), and social capital 
(proposition 4).  The estimation of the model shows first that proposition 1 can be 
rejected.  These results do not support the conclusion that human capital is a large and 
significant determinant of adoption.
19  This is consistent with one of two recent studies of 
adoption in Tanzania: while Nkonya, Schroeder and Norman (1997)) present empirical 
evidence that years of education are a significant determinant of adoption in Northern 
                                                                                                                                                 
exogeneity of ‘ethnic affiliations’, ‘consultative norms’, and ‘leadership heterogeneity’.  By 
contrast, both tests can easily reject the null of the exogeneity of ‘land’. 
19  This can also be rejected when ‘literacy’, a dummy variable for the achievement of 
literacy in reading and writing, is used as an alternative human capital measure.        21 
Tanzania, Kaliba et al. (1998) present empirical evidence that years of education are not a 
significant determinant in the intermediate and lowland zones.   
Second, proposition 2 cannot be rejected (using the 10 percent level of 
significance): households with greater land under cultivation are more likely to have 
adopted improved fertilizer, in both the regular probit and the IV probit estimations.
20 
Third, proposition 3 cannot be rejected in the Central Plateau: in this agro-
ecological zone, households are more likely to have adopted fertilizer in the 1994-95 
growing season in the presence of greater adoption among their neighbors.  By contrast, 
proposition 3 can be rejected in the Plains.  One likely explanation for this result is that 
the overall use of fertilizer in this agro-ecological zone is still relatively low.  The mean 
for ‘cumulative adoption’ among these households is 0.08: this translates into about 1 
household per village sample.  Consequently, there are few neighbors from whom one 
can yet learn about the benefits of fertilizer adoption.
21 
       
                                                 
20 This is a case where the two-tail test used here is particularly demanding: it seems 
unlikely that greater land endowments will be negatively associated with fertilizer use.  
21 Rogers (1995) documents, in the case of many different forms of technology adoption, 
an ‘S’ shaped (cumulative) curve of adoption which is consistent with this explanation.  In many 
cases, adopter distribution rise slowly in the early stages of diffusion, then accelerates with more 
rapid distribution, and then slows when the diffusion is almost complete.           22 
 
Table 2:  A Test of the Model of Technology Adoption in Two Agro-Ecological 
Zones 
Region  Central Plateau   Plains 
Estimation technique  Probit    ProbitIV    Probit    ProbitIV  
Years of education  0.0035    0.0020   0.074    0.0401  
  (0.063)   (0.061)   (0.095)   (0.118)  
Land  0.35 ***  0.55 *  0.63 ***  0.98 * 
  (0.12)    (0.34)   (0.21)    (0.57)  
Cumulative adoption  3.17 ***  2.99 ***  -3.63    -3.06  
  (0.56)    (0.82)   (2.56)    (3.39)  
Ethnic affiliations  2.98 **  2.58 *  8.88 *  9.20 * 
  (1.24)   (1.50)   (4.85)   (5.21)  
Consultative norms   1.64    1.44   5.88 ***  5.78 ** 
  (1.38)   (1.89)   (2.01)   (2.81)  
Leadership 
heterogeneity  1.65    1.86   0.48    0.71  
  (1.38)   (1.30)   (1.10)   (1.34)  
Female  0.25    0.46   -0.652    -0.49  
  (0.35)   (0.57)   (0.54)   (0.89)  
Age  0.075    0.065   -0.093    -0.119  
  (0.050)   (0.065)   (0.074)   (0.095)  
Age squared  -0.00089 *  -0.00079   0.00083    0.00108  
  (0.00048)   (0.00064)   (0.00079)   (0.00093)  
Improved seeds  1.11 ***  1.04 **  0.68 *  0.56  
  (0.35)   (0.44)   (0.37)   (0.64)  
Credit availability  0.74 **  0.52   0.74    0.94  
  (0.37)   (0.64)   (0.60)   (0.74)  
Extension activity  2.01 ***  1.97 ***  1.02 ***  0.90  
  (0.54)   (0.59)   (0.39)   (0.57)  
Years in village  0.44 ***  0.41 ***  0.10    -0.04  
  (0.12)   (0.14)   (0.11)   (0.28)  
Adjusted R-squared  0.71   --   0.43   --  
               
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘fertilizer adoption’.  See text for description of 
variables.          23 
Fourth, in the case of ‘ethnic affiliations’, proposition 4 cannot be rejected in both 
agro-ecological zones: households are more likely to have adopted fertilizer in the 
presence of ethnically homogenous social structures.  Replacing ‘ethnic affiliations’ with 
‘ethnic fractionalization’, a measure of village-level ethnic heterogeneity, leads to a 
similar result (with p-values of 0.10 and 0.01, respectively, in the Plateau and the Plains). 
While providing additional evidence that the local ethnic composition affects fertilizer 
adoption, one cannot isolate in this model any difference between the ethnic composition 
within social structures in a village and the ethnic composition across a village.  Overall, 
this evidence is consistent with the general evidence detailed by Easterly and Levine 
(1997) that ethnic fractionalization is associated with poor development outcomes in 
Africa.   
In the case of ‘consultative norms’ in the Plains, proposition 4 cannot be rejected: 
in this zone, households are more likely to have adopted fertilizer in the presence of 
participatory social structures.  (The p-values for ‘consultative norms’ in the Plateau are 
0.24 and 0.39, respectively.)  It is not obvious why this aspect of the model is so region 
specific.  These results -- in a region where the average adoption rate is only nine percent 
– do raise the possibility that participatory norms may be particularly important in the 
early stages of adoption.   
Among the other independent variables, ‘improved seeds’ and ‘extension activity’ 
are significant determinants of adoption in the first three specifications; ‘years in village’ 
is also a positive and significant determinant in both specifications in the Central Plateau,        24 
whereas ‘credit availability’ is significant in the first specification.  In the Probit IV 
model for the Plains, the lack of significance of the other agricultural inputs --     
‘improved seeds’, ‘extension activity’ and ‘credit availability’ – may again be explained 
by the relatively low rate of overall adoption.  It seems unlikely that these inputs are not 
positively associated with the eventual adoption of improved fertilizer. 
Table 3 presents the marginal effects
22 and point elasticities of ‘land’, ‘cumulative 
adoption’ and the two significant social capital variables in the cases where they are 
significant determinants of adoption.  Following Grootaert (2001), these elasticities show 
the effect of a one percent increase of each independent variable on the probability of 
adoption.  In each agro-ecological zone, the elasticities for the social capital variables are 
comparable to those of the other significant variables: in the Central Plateau, ‘land’ has 
about twice the effect as ‘cumulative adoption’ and ‘ethnic affiliations’; in the Plains 
Plateau, ‘land’ has about the same effect as ‘ethnic affiliations’ and about half of the 
effect of ‘consultative norms.’      
                                                 
22 The marginal effects are calculated as 
d X i X
X
∂
Φ ∂ ) ( β
, where Xi is the regressor 
associated with each of the propositions.  This expression and the point elasticities are evaluated 
at the mean of all regressors.        25 
 
Table 3:  Effects of selected independent variables on the probability of adoption 
 Central  Plateau  Plains 
 Marginal  effect  Point 
elasticity 
Marginal effect  Point 
elasticity 
Land 0.033  0.036  0.017  0.0053 
Cumulative adoption  0.303  0.020  --  -- 
Ethnic affiliations  0.285  0.018  0.237  0.0049 
Consultative norms  --  --  0.157  0.0107 
Notes: Dependent variable is ‘fertilizer adoption’.  See text for description of calculations. 
 
In summary, the estimation of the model in this section shows that the probability 
of adoption of improved fertilizer in 1994-95 in the Central Plateau region is increasing in 
land under cultivation, cumulative adoption patterns, and ethnically-based social 
affiliations: in the Plains region, this probability is increasing in land under cultivation, 
ethnically-based social affiliations and consultative norms.  Selected characteristics of 
social structures in two regions of Tanzania are significant and relatively large 
determinants of fertilizer adoption among rural households. 
        26 
VI.  Conclusion 
Building on the qualitative results of Rogers (1995) and the theoretical approach 
of Feder and Slade (1984), this paper has modeled and tested how specific characteristics 
of social structure affect a distinct economic decision: the adoption of a new technology.  
This section concludes with observations about the methodological and policy relevance 
of the results presented in this paper. 
The first micro-empirical studies that used survey data with information about 
local social structures relied on aggregate measures of social capital as determinants of a 
range of development outcomes.  For example, using the same SCPS data from Tanzania, 
the research strategy of Narayan and Pritchett (1999) was to create a single ‘index of 
social capital’ from weighted means of eight variables measuring vastly different 
characteristics of social structures, and then to test whether this composite index was 
associated with different indicators of well-being.   
The limitation of this approach is that it does not detail how distinct forms of 
social capital may affect economic outcomes though different mechanisms: for example, 
by diffusing information, reducing collective action dilemmas, affecting transactions 
costs, or increasing risk mitigation (Isham 2002).  In fact, one of the variables included in 
Narayan and Pritchett’s ‘index of social capital’ is membership heterogeneity, which, 
according to the results presented in this paper, has a negative affect on fertilizer 
adoption. Yet ethnic heterogeneity may have a positive effect on other development 
outcomes in Tanzania, depending on the underlying economic mechanism.  For example,        27 
using similar survey data from rural Indonesia, Grootaert (2001) finds that the highest 
participation in local collective action--for example, building schools and maintaining 
roads--comes from members of more homogenous organizations, but that membership in 
internally  heterogeneous organizations provides benefits to individual households in 
terms of access to credit and pooled savings. 
Accordingly, the results presented in this paper suggest that measures of social 
capital should be as narrowly defined as possible -- or that econometric models that use 
composite indices should at least verify these results with alternative measures of social 
capital (as in Isham and Kähkönen 2002).  Had a composite index been used in this case, 
it would not have been possible to distinguish among the effects of group homogeneity, 
participatory norms, and leadership heterogeneity.
23 
What are the policy implications of the research presented in this paper for 
development assistance in Tanzania--and in the rest of Sub-Saharan Africa?  Households 
with ethnically based and participatory social affiliations may be more likely to diffuse 
new information successfully -- and to adopt new technologies.  Such information does 
not provide a prima facie justification to avoid investing in development projects to 
promote improved technologies -- for example, via extension programs -- in communities 
with high ethnic fragmentation or less participatory social affiliations.  Many poor 
                                                 
23 For example, replacing the three measures of social capital in the estimation of the 
model with a single composite index that includes ‘ethnic affiliations’, consultative norms’, and 
‘leadership heterogeneity’ can easily generate positive and significant determinants of adoption 
in both the Central Plateau and the Plains.          28 
communities with the most urgent need for improved agricultural techniques may be 
ethnically diverse and non-participatory.   
   Instead, the allocation of investment resources for development projects may need 
to be adjusted to account for the characteristics of local social structures.  Possible 
adjustments include more direct follow-up with individual farmers to counteract 
patchwork patterns of adoption in ethnically diverse areas, and investments in the 
strengthening of local organizations (for example, through direct training about new 
agricultural techniques).  For example, under FAO’s ‘Special Programme for Food 
Security’ in the Dodoma and Morogoro regions of Tanzania, farmers groups, input 
suppliers and other local stakeholders were consulted using participatory rural appraisal 
(PRA) techniques.  Subsequently, eighty-six percent of targeted farmers adopted a set of 
recommended production technologies -- including improved seeds and fertilizer 
application (FAO 2000).   
Like all potential investments in a development project, the expected net benefits 
of such investments should be compared to the expected net benefits of others: for 
example, in project infrastructure.  At least, knowledge of the composition of local social 
structures can provide development practitioners in Sub-Saharan Africa with more 
complete information to guide their potential investments.         29 
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